

VOTECAL RFP COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS
SACRAMENTO COUNTY
February 25, 2008

General Notes: The purpose of the RFP is to describe the business and technological capabilities and requirements of the proposed VoteCal system, as well as to identify the expectations of the vendor to develop and implement this system as part of the contract. Many of the questions asked below, while valid and important, address policy issues that are outside of this scope – such as how counties and EMS vendors may be compensated for requisite changes to local EMS systems, or how standard codes for data will be established for the system.

The following assumptions were implicit in the development of the RFP:

- Once a winning proposal had been identified and the contract awarded, that vendor would meet with counties, their vendors and SOS staff to work out the fine details on how the system would work and to develop specifications for data exchange that took into account the actual data elements and available technologies of the county EMS systems.
- The SOS, not the VoteCal vendor, would be responsible for managing the process of county EMS vendors making the requisite modifications to their systems for integration with the new VoteCal system. The VoteCal vendor would only be responsible for testing the data submissions from the updated county systems to verify compliance with the agreed upon interface standards.
- Counties, their vendors, and SOS all have a vested interest in the successful implementation of the HAVA mandated VoteCal system, and will work together to identify the optimum solution for these policy issues for the benefit of our ultimate customers – the voters in California.

Furthermore, our business based procurement approach means that vendors have wide latitude to propose technologies and processes that they feel best meet the business outcomes we have identified in the RFP requirements. Consequently, they cannot be answered until a final solution is chosen and the technology and processes of that system are known.

Finally, while the procurement process is necessarily confidential and input is restricted to representative counties through the designated advisory groups, the post-procurement planning, development, testing and implementation phases of the project (where most of the requirements will be refined to great detail) will be fully public and open when the contract has been awarded to the winning bidder. You will note from the Statement of Work (VoteCal Contract, Attachment 1, Exhibits 2 & 3) that the vendor is required to provide detailed plans for project management, communications, quality assurance, risk management, and organizational change management that will include keeping counties and their vendors involved and informed throughout the project. As noted above, vendors are also expected to hold detailed JAD sessions with counties and their vendors to refine the system requirements in great detail in the development of the final system design and specifications.

Finally, the answers below are presented to help guide counties in reviewing and understanding the VoteCal RFP. These answers are informational for the counties and not meant to be a legal interpretation of the RFP or its requirements and in the event one or more of the questions below conflict with the actual RFP, the language of the RFP will prevail.

Note: Some questions have been grouped together based on their subject matter.

Section IV

As this is a summary overview of Section VI, most comments will be stated under Section VI. However, listed below are a few comments requesting clarification of some details in Section IV.

In general, please note that Section IV was meant as a general narrative overview of the VoteCal strategy, not a definitive statement of the requirements, which can be found in Section V, Section VI, and the VoteCal Contract.

Page IV-4 Section D

There are 3 strategic benefits; who will validate that these 3 benefits are being met at all levels? What is the baseline data used to calculate whether the benefit has been met? County has concern with the third benefit specifically, as this will directly impact delivery of services to County's clients.

Section IV of the RFP is meant to be a high-level overview of the proposed VoteCal system, not a specific statement of the requirements. The primary purpose and justification of VoteCal is legal compliance with the requirements of HAVA. These three possible outcomes were identified as *potential* ancillary benefits to the successful implementation of VoteCal, apart from the primary benefit – the satisfaction of HAVA. You will note that the “third benefit” identified speaks to the timeliness, accuracy, and availability of data and reports *for statewide use*. Compared to the data in our current Calvoter system (which the US DOJ has identified as clearly not HAVA compliant), the proposed VoteCal system will improve the timeliness, accuracy, and availability of registrant data within the State database, as discussed in the remainder of this section.

You have a justifiable concern of whether the data within the system (and the processes for accessing that data) on which counties will rely to conduct their elections, truly meets the counties' needs. The RFP requirements try to establish the expected business outcomes for the VoteCal system, including access to the data. We have asked that you and other county officials review the requirements to verify that they will meet your needs. In particular, the technical requirements on to pages VI-95 through VI-97 of the RFP set forth measurable standards for data availability and system performance.

Page IV-7 Section 3, last paragraph

Counties will be required to acquire and maintain a compliant EMS system. No mention of cost recovery for County is included in this document. Should the State require a County to perform a function, that function will be paid by the State. Please provide details on how this cost recovery will be accomplished.

As noted above, this was not addressed because it is outside of the scope of this RFP. SOS understands that the project will not be successful unless we can work out a plan to manage remediation of the county EMS systems. However, we will not be able to address this concern until we know what the new system is and can work out a solution with your vendors.

Allows for reasonable acceptance testing of the interface. County needs to define what reasonable means. Should EMS system not meet County's needs and/or requirements during acceptance testing, what is the recourse for correcting any acceptance test failures?

Acceptance testing will be confined to verifying that the data submissions from independent counties fully conform to the interfaces standards. The Statement of Work (VoteCal Contract, Attachment 1, Exhibits 2 & 3) requires the vendor to submit a final, detailed testing plan prior to that phase of the project.

Page IV-7 Section 4b and Page IV-9 Section 4e, 4f

VoteCal is anticipated to obtain voter identity matching from several sources, many of which are unreliable. How will VoteCal work to indemnify County from errors originating from VoteCal? What resources will VoteCal provide County to resolve errors?

The proposed matching process is covered in great detail in Section VI, most notably in Sections S9 through S14. We have required a flexible system that allows us to:

- Flexibly define criteria sets for matching and assign those sets to various processes;
- Assign "confidence levels" to a criteria set as it is applied to a process;
- Establish confidence level thresholds for a process, such that matches that exceed the confidence level can be automatically processed, while matches below that confidence level generate a notice to the county to research and resolve.
- Configure, for each county, whether "automatic" matches must be reviewed and "blessed" before they are applied.

Finally, should, at some later time, it be determined that a match was incorrectly applied – either by an automated process or by county processing – we have required VoteCal to provide the capability to completely "undo" such transactions.

As we have frequently noted, there are some data sets (such as the CDCR felon records) that are so unreliable, it is likely we will never find a criteria set that can allow automatic processing of that data.

These matching processes (NCOA, death records, felon records, DMV change of address, duplicate identification) are mandated by law and are occurring already. With the current Calvoter system, this is largely a manual process that requires county staff to research and determine the validity of each match. The proposed process will automate processing of such matches only in situations where there is a high confidence level and counties have chosen to have such matches automatically applied. Hopefully, you will experience a reduction in staff workload as a result.

Other Considerations

Redistricting will take place shortly after full roll-out of this new system. However, it does not seem to be covered in the RFP. How does VoteCal propose to perform redistricting tasks in a timely manner in 2011 in preparation for the February 2012 presidential election, which not affecting any 2011 fall elections?

The VoteCal system should have no impact on counties who integrate with VoteCal through their county election management system. They will perform the redistricting within their local system, as they always have. Once completed, they will send the updated precinct assignments and related data for mapping precincts to the newly assigned districts *as they always have*. (Of course, the data will come in the new established and tested formats for data exchange with VoteCal.)

For counties that choose to integrate with VoteCal using the optional proposed VoteCal EMS (if any), they would perform the redistricting within the VoteCal EMS application just as the independent counties will do in their local systems. We have required flexible systems for defining and changing address tables, precinct definitions and district definitions similar to those in the more mature county election management systems.

How will VoteCal implement the many changes in election law on a timely basis? How will County be trained on system changes?

VoteCal will be updated continuously for various reasons. How will SOS ensure local EMS will follow along with these updates?

This will depend on the nature of the change and how the county participates in VoteCal.

Independent counties (integrating through their local EMS): If the statute change affects business processes and does not affect the data that must be submitted to VoteCal, counties would work with their EMS vendor to make the necessary changes to their systems, *as they do now*, independent of VoteCal. If the statute change requires modification to the data exchange requirements and formats, SOS would need to work with counties and their EMS vendors to identify and implement the modified requirements. Depending on the scope of the changes, this could become a new formal project. We expect that local EMS vendors would continue to be responsible for changes made to their systems,

VoteCal EMS counties: SOS would be responsible for making the required changes to the system and providing the necessary training for implementing those changes. With the proposed browser-based design, the deployment becomes simple. We just “turn the new features on” and all participating counties are automatically using the new updates!

Finally, you should note that we’ve tried to anticipate many potential changes on the horizon, such as registration of students well before they are 18. In those cases, we’ve tried to build those capabilities into the RFP requirements now so that if they become law, the VoteCal system can adapt *without any change*!

Section VI

Page VI-1 Section A

VoteCal is to be the whole system. How will system integrate with the variety of other equipment currently utilized by County, including signature verification equipment, mail processing equipment, and vbm ballot processing equipment?

It is not accurate to characterize VoteCal as “the whole system.” The VoteCal RFP clearly anticipates that many (if not all) counties will participate in the VoteCal system by using their current local election management system. While there will likely be changes to the local

election management system for its integration with VoteCal, these changes should largely be invisible to your users. You should be able to use all of the automation equipment you are currently using with your system, as well as any new equipment your vendor wishes to support.

For the optional VoteCal EMS system, there is no requirement for support of the automation equipment you identified. Our goal was to target a simpler, low-risk system that, once proven, could be later upgraded to incorporate such features if there was sufficient user demand. If the optional VoteCal EMS is bid and is accepted, counties would need to factor this into their consideration of whether or not to use the VoteCal EMS.

Page VI-2 1 – Project Management

Does County have input on the PMP?

Are County-responsible tasks to be included in the GANTT chart deadlines?

Does County sign off on any tasks affecting County?

The RFP requires that bidders propose a draft Project Management Plan (as well as several other draft plans.) This is so that the State Evaluation Team can evaluate how the bidders approach to managing the project. (e.g., How realistic is the plan? How risky is the approach? Does the bidder fully understand the complexities of the project?) The expectation for counties and their vendors must be clearly identified. (Again, for “independent counties”, the required effort to remediate their election management systems and implement the updates are outside the scope of this RFP and contract.)

The Statement of Work indicates that once the procurement phase is completed and the implementation phase begins, the vendor is required to submit final versions of these plans. These plans will all be public record. They will also be living documents that will be adjusted as required throughout the project.

As the VoteCal implementation will be a contract between the State of California and the vendor, it would only be appropriate for the SOS to “sign-off” on the deliverable tasks. The counties are not a legal party to the contract. Due to the existing relationships between the counties and their vendors, it is likely that counties will need to “sign-off” for any contracted changes to *their* election management system.

Page VI-3 2 – Project Progress

How will County be included in the MPSR? What sign-off does County have to validate tasks are on time and/or complete?

Who is on VoteCal steering committee? How does County join?

The contract for the development and implementation will be between the vendor and the Secretary of State. Counties have no legal basis or authority to “sign-off” on the vendor’s reports. However, these reports will be a matter of public record and will be available to counties for review. The Secretary of State has also contracted with independent vendors to provide oversight. The contracted IV&V vendor will independently review all plans and deliverables and produce public reports that the completed tasks and deliverables meet expectations and requirements. The Independent Project Oversight Contractor (IPOC) will monitor and review the entire project effort, reporting directly to the Steering Committee and the

California Department of Finance on the project management and progress, identifying potential risks and known issues. IPOC reports will be public record.

As the Secretary of State is responsible for the implementation of HAVA as the Chief Election Official, the VoteCal Steering Committee is composed of Secretary of State management staff that will oversee the project and provide policy direction as required.

Page VI-4 3 – Training

How does SOS propose to provide on-going training post implementation to County staff?

The details of the training will depend on the solution finally selected in the procurement process. Requirement P11, to which you've referred, asks the bidder to present a draft training plan for their proposed solution, so that we can evaluate their training approach as part of the evaluation of their bid. You will notice from the Statement of Work, that the requirement states the vendor is expected to "provide training for SOS staff (to utilize the train the trainer approach)" so that SOS staff can provide "on-going training post-implementation." The approved VoteCal Feasibility Study Report (FSR), which gave us authorization to start the VoteCal project, budgeted for additional SOS staff to provide this training.

Post-implementation, SOS would provide independent counties with ongoing training on VoteCal system processes and policies. The county's EMS vendor would continue to provide training (and support) on use of their application, including modifications made for integration with VoteCal. If the optional VoteCal EMS is bid and implemented, SOS staff would be responsible for providing ongoing training post-implementation for users of that application.

Page VI-6 4 – Data Conversion

When does County validate the test data conversion?

As noted above, this is outside the scope of this contract. This is a detail that will be worked out after we pick a VoteCal solution. Once a final solution is chosen, SOS will work out the conversion and integration process with independent counties and their vendors. If the optional VoteCal EMS is bid and implemented, the process for test data conversion will be proposed by the vendor as appropriate for their solution and will be finalized during the implementation phases of the project.

Page VI-7 6 - Testing

The 1.5 million voter registration record assumption is too low for a Presidential General Election.

Storage requirement must take into account inactive and canceled files to ensure total space requirements are being tested.

SOS is requiring the vendor to conduct pilot testing with a few selected counties prior to full deployment statewide. SOS has not identified the counties to be involved in that pilot testing. (We prefer volunteers.) The number of 1.5 million voter records you have quoted was provided to the vendor to set a limit on the number and size of the counties to be involved in that pilot testing. (For instance, we probably would not be using LA, Orange or San Diego counties.)

In technical requirement T4.3 (Page VI-97), we have required the system be delivered with a capacity of thirty million active, inactive, and cancelled voters. Also, the system must be capable of storing one hundred million active, inactive, and cancelled voters with the addition of hardware only.

Page VI-7 C - The SOS Management Role item 3
Which County experts will be used as resources?

The purpose of this section is to detail what resources SOS will provide for the project (e.g., working space, and the role of SOS staff) for the bidder to take into account when preparing their proposal. While we have made it clear that bidders will be working with counties and their vendors as experts to flesh out the system specifications and design, as well as the actual implementation, counties are not a “resource provided by the SOS” as it relates to this section.

Page VI-9 Item 1

Should bidder staff be replaced, what input does County have to validate the replacement staff?

The VoteCal implementation project will be a contract between the State and the VoteCal vendor. Once the contract is awarded and the implementation phase of the project starts, all activities will be a matter of public record.

Business Functional Requirements

S1.4 – Is the voter record updated with details on actions/changes taken by SOS staff?

Yes. Please note that requirement S1.7 stipulates that sufficient information must be sent to the county for important and automatic process of those actions and changes. Requirements T9.1 through T9.6 require an extensive audit trail of the changes to the voter record. Furthermore, requirement S1.1 provides that counties will have the ability to review all data for any registered voter.

S1.5 – Who pays for the interface support to VoteCal?

As noted in the introductory remarks above, this is outside the scope of this RFP and will be separately managed by SOS. The VoteCal FSR, approved by the CA Department of Finance, contemplates the use of HAVA funds for this effort. These details will be negotiated and finalized down the road, once a vendor and system are selected.

S1.8 – Current election code allows for canceled records to be deleted following 4 years on the cancel file. Where will these permanently stored records be stored? County will not hold these after 4 years.

What is the turn-around time for archived data?

These will be stored as part of the VoteCal system, although retrieval will likely not be as prompt as for “live” registration records. Turnaround will depend on the solution implemented by the vendor. This will be an additional benefit of VoteCal – retention of the data beyond your four years!

S2.2 – Other data needed to be captured includes but it not limited to Multiple First, Middle and Last Names, Hyphenated First, Middle, and Last Names, Names with Apostrophes

The last bullet of this requirement should cover all these items. Please provide more detail if you think this isn't the case.

Not listed, but should be:

VoteCal must be capable of capturing and storing a voters'

Poll Worker preference – We are considering adding Poll Worker preference (with respect to work assignments) to requirement E21.2 for the Election Worker Management section of the VoteCal EMS. For independent counties integrating with their local EMS, this functionality was not contemplated. It was expected that election worker management would continue to be performed in the local county system, hence no need to include this data element in the VoteCal voter registration system. *If you feel this assumption is incorrect, please provide more information to support that belief.*

Permanent VBM preference – We believe this is covered by requirement S19.1. *Please let us know if there is additional information you think we need to capture.*

Citizenship selection – We are considering an addition to the requirements to capture a voter's indication of citizenship status in a future addendum.

S2.13 – Status option of pending and declined must allow comment fields

Requirement S2.13 requires VoteCal to capture the reason for the change in status, in addition to current and historic status and the effective dates of such changes. Furthermore, requirements S2.25 and S2.26 provide the ability to capture comments and notes about a voter record. If you feel these are insufficient for your purpose, can you please provide more information on the type and purpose of the additional data you would want to capture?

S2.28 – There are several varieties of confidential voter status, not just one type. Some allow name but not address to be shown on public records, some allow record to show in full on specified reports while not on public reports, some are not viewable in any report. This section needs to be better defined for bidder to ensure confidential records are managed correctly in VoteCal.

In preparing the RFP requirements, we identified three types of confidential voters: "court ordered" (EC §2166), "victims of domestic violence" (EC §2166.5) and "public safety officers" (EC §2166.7). In each case, the statute specifically lists the confidentiality of the residence address, the telephone number and the email address. In each case, the statute also leaves it to the county's option whether to include the mailing address for the voter in the roster, or to substitute the designation "confidential" in place of the address. We have tried to write the requirement in accordance with this interpretation. If there are other classes of confidential voters that we have failed to take into account, or if you believe we have misinterpreted the statute, please provide more information.

S3.6 – A response time of 60 second or more will result in ineffective telephone help lines on election day, resulting in disenfranchised voters.

Agreed. Technical requirement T4.1 generally requires a response time of less than 1 second for routine transactions, such as updating or retrieving a record. The purpose of this requirement is

to provide a warning to the user if the user initiates a search for which the response will take an extended time. (For example, a user requests a statewide search of all registrants whose name begins with “S”.)

S4.1 – It is unclear how ‘other state agencies’ will be entering voter registration cards. Who validates and is responsible for their work product? How is the data on the VRC held confidential at these other state agencies?

The NVRA requires that other state agencies offer and assist in voter registration. Currently, this happens on paper voter registration cards that are sent to the county for approval and input. This clause is an example of our attempt to build capability into the system, as legislators have expressed interest in bringing California closer in compliance with the provisions of NVRA. Our goal here would be to automate the process, if possible, to reduce turnaround time and save you staff time in manually entering paper VRCs.

S4.6 – The UID could be reassigned to the same voter who returns to the county after having moved out of county for a period of years. This entry is not clear on how system will manage voters in this case.

Exactly! That’s the point (reassignment of the UID to the same voter who returns.) For example, think of your driver’s license number as an analogy. If you live in Alameda County and move to Yuba County, you don’t get a new driver’s license number. DMV just updates your record to indicate your new address. The UID will be the voter’s “ID” number for voter registration statewide. This will facilitate the identification and update of the voter’s existing record as the voter moves out of your county and then back again at a later time. The purpose of this requirement (S4.6) is to keep the system from creating two records for the same voter.

S4.9 – It is unclear what ‘refusal’ means in this context. Current language is ‘pend’. Are these the same?

No. A “pend” would occur when there is insufficient information to complete and approve registration for a voter, such as missing the date of birth; or when there is an issue that needs to be resolved before registration can be approved, such as the Social Security Administration returns a “single match, deceased” to a verification check of the voter’s SSN4. We have developed requirements for the system to also capture the data for individuals for whom the counties have denied or “refused” registration. Under requirement S4.9, the voter would be a “pend” while the county tried to contact the voter and obtain the signature. At some point, if the county was unable to get the missing signature, the county would need to decline the registration for that voter, and the voter’s status would be changed to “declined”.

S4.10 – It should be noted that the system is being required to verify data that it did not capture. The US Citizenship information should be added under section S2.

Thank you for your feedback. As noted above, we have taken this under consideration for a future addendum to the RFP.

S4.12 – VoteCal is intended to ‘suspend’ a file. What does suspend entail? Is this the same as what is currently referred to as ‘pend’? If not what is the difference?

Correct. Under current regulation and practice, a SSN4 verification response of “single match – deceased” is one of the few instances where registration of the voter must be *suspended* until the county can resolve the issue. During the time the county is working to resolve this issue, the voter registration would be assigned a status code of “pending”.

S4.15 – System must allow an override to the USPS data, which is sometimes not current and correct for the County.

How will VoteCal maintain compliance with USPS rules and regulations?

This requirement addresses normalization of the effective *mailing* address to USPS standards (not residence addresses.) The “how” is left for bidders to address in their proposal and will be refined during the JAD session during the project design phase.

S4.17 – County requires death notice to be provided in paper, not electronic file. How will County receive this from SOS?

S4.18 – County requires felon information to be provided in paper, not electronic file. How will County receive this from the SOS?

All counties currently receive electronic death notices via Calvoter from the CA Department of Public Health (CDPH) and electronic felon notices from the CA Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)– and have for years. The exact “how” and format of the notices under VoteCal will depend on the winning bidder’s proposal and will be refined in the JAD sessions with counties and their vendors in the early implementation phases of the project.

S4.19 – VoteCal must immediately provide County access to all records and images related to the file.

S4.20 – It is unclear how DMV will perform voter registration functions. How will SOS indemnify County from all problems that originate at DMV, which currently occur without protection to the County?

There has been considerable interest in the legislature to modify statute so as to require implementation of “motor voter” (NVRA) along the lines of the successful best practices around the country. This is our attempt to require the capability within VoteCal so that, if such efforts come to fruition, the system will not require expensive modification. As for indemnification under the current process or future processes, this is a policy issue outside the scope of this RFP. However, in the requirements we have specified the capability to configure the system for each county’s preference as to whether or not the county wants to review and “bless” automatic transactions before they are actually made in the system.

S4.21- Currently, losing county does not verify the loss of a voter to another county. It is anticipated that adding this task to the current excessive level of work will disenfranchise voters during peak/late registration periods. County does not have paperwork to review to verify the change.

Based on feedback from members of the County technical advisory committee, this requirement was written to provide the county the opportunity to review notices of a voter move out of that county *if they wish* and to override that move if they feel it is incorrect (i.e., not the same voter

that just registered in another county.) Hopefully, the new VoteCal process will save your staff time because most of those changes will occur automatically as an update to the voter's existing record, as part of the re-registration process in the new county. Your staff will not have to receive, research, and enter duplicate notices manually for such moves.

S4.22 – The list shown is not exhaustive and it is hoped that all modifications will be required in the VoteCal system.

The list is not meant to be exhaustive. The intent is for the system to accept all modifications from the county EMSs to the voter registration data elements identified in requirement section S2 and elsewhere in the RFP requirements.

S5.7 – What is the contingency plan for down time during critical election periods, such as E-15 or election day?

Requirement S5.7 was written specifically to ensure that a voter's registration *wasn't* delayed if the ID verification process was unavailable at the time of registration entry and processing. In such cases, the system is required to process the voter registration and assign a generated UID (as it does for voters without a DL or SSN4). When the verification service is later restored, the system is required to automatically process the ID verification at that time and to automatically make the necessary corrections to the voter record and notify the county.

You may want to review the technical requirements on Availability and Operational Recovery (section T3) and Performance and Capacity (section T4). In general, we are requiring redundant server environments with synchronization, so that if one location fails the other location can immediately assume the workload without interruption of services. The technological "how" will depend on the winning bidder's proposal.

S6- generally for all entries in this section:

Requires DMV to process VRC's which is not currently done. Will require buy-in by DMV as well as extensive training of DMV staff. County will want to be held harmless of any errors created by DMV which disenfranchise voter(s). County does not currently register any voter without paper VRC record on file as there is no way to verify the actions taken by County in entering data into EMS without original paper record. RFP continues to require losing county take action to release voter to new county; this is not the current practice and County does not see need for this required action.

Please see the responses to your questions about requirements S4.20 and S4.21 above. There is no requirement for counties to "release" a voter who moves out of a county – only the capability for a county to review such transactions, if they wish, and to reverse such transactions if they believe they are in error.

Generally, the section S6 requirements were written to support the current "motor voter" implementation as well as to provide the capability to adapt to potential future legislative changes that are currently under discussion.

You currently receive electronic notices of voter in-county change of address from DMV via Calvoter. “Motor Voter” is a federal law and reinforced with State statute. We cannot change the legal requirements, but we can try to implement a system that better handles the process. We have tried to specify a system that can provide *faster* notification of *all* registration activities that occur at state agencies under the NVRA. The system will have the *capability* to electronically provide you with all necessary data to complete the registration immediately – including the signature image – without waiting for a paper record that can be delayed or lost in the mail. For high-confidence registration transactions, the registration additions and updates (including address updates) can be applied automatically – to save your staff valuable time researching and entering such transactions. Finally, the system is required to be separately configurable for each county as to whether these high-confidence transactions are automatically applied without review, or whether county review and approval is required before they are completed. (As we have reviewed the implementations of statewide databases under HAVA around the country, the one consistent feedback we have received from all of them has been how much they have appreciated the automatic processing of the motor-voter registrations. Many have reported as much as 80% of their registration activity now occurs that way automatically, without human intervention and without problems.)

S6.9 – Does the record go into ‘pending’ to allow the voter to be timely registered when problems are resolved? This will be important for registrations received at E-15.

This requirement was written to conform to current statute and practice. A DMV COA transaction is one where the voter, at DMV, says they are currently a registered voter and wants their voter registration updated with the new address. EC §2120 requires that if the county of residence cannot find an existing registration record for the voter to update, the voter must be sent a notice together with a new voter registration application. This requirement states that *after* a county has made a determination that there is no existing voter registration record, the VoteCal system must flag the transaction as a non-match for which a notice must be sent to the applicant. What is new is that we have required the system to have the capability for these notices to be generated and sent by the State as well as the county and to note when they have been sent (should we all decide this is a more efficient way to handle this legal requirement.)

S6.10 – It is unclear what notice is being referenced in this requirement. What is the format of this form; how would a DMV COA not match a voter’s file?

Requirements S6.10 through S6.13 all refer to the notice that must be sent to a person who attempts to update their registration address through DMV for which no existing registration record can be found. (Please see the response to your question about requirement S6.9 above.)

S7.1 – Recent change in election code (AB452) requires notice of any change in party be added to the VNC. This should be reflected in this requirement.

You will note that this requirement already specifies that the voter’s partisan affiliation must be included on the VNCs. This requirement also stipulates that the SOS must have the capability to define and modify “the format and content” of the VNCs, so there should be no issues with meeting the provisions of EC §2155 as modified by AB452. Please let us know if you think there is something further we need to consider on this issue.

S7.2 – All districts must be included, such as local and county districts.

We understood that a voter's current assigned political districts are not currently printed on the VNCs. In our review of other states and their implementation of HAVA-compliant statewide databases, this was a feature that many reported as well received by the voter's in their state, so we thought we would add that capability for possible future use. This is the first time anyone has suggested that the VNC drill down to all the local districts as well, but we will take this under consideration for a possible future addendum to the RFP.

S7.5 – Counties need to have ability and control of when VNCs are printed. The need to transfer this task to the SOS is unclear.

Counties are currently responsible for printing and mailing of all VNCs under EC §2155. In many cases, these are mailed a few at a time at first-class postage rates. Furthermore, counties must spend staff time to keep track of the postage for VNCs and process requests for reimbursement of their postage accounts to the State. As we discussed in each of the recent county regional briefings, it may be beneficial to have this process performed by the State at some point in the future. The State can automatically produce this mailing in a batch process to take advantage of the bulk mailing rates and, in the process, save county staff time in generating the VNCs and tracking the postage accounts. Accordingly, we have required the VoteCal system (requirements S7.3 through S7.8) to accommodate VNCs produced by the counties, as they currently are, and to provide the capability for the State to generate them on the county's behalf. We have had a similar process in place with Calvoter for years to generate the notices for failed DMV COA transactions on behalf of the counties. They are printed and mailed on a batch basis by the Office of State Publishing and each is customized (contact information, return address) as if the county had actually sent it.

S7.7 – It is unclear why County needs to confirm that a VNC was sent; this function should automatically be updated in the voter's file and a report should automatically be generated listing all voters who were sent a VNC for that batch mailing.

Sometimes documents are sent to a printer but do not actually get printed, such as when the printer jams or runs out of ink/toner. This requirement was written so that, in instances where the user was generating the VNCs directly from the VoteCal system, the user could confirm that the VNCs were successfully printed out before the voters' records were updated to reflect the VNCs had been generated. (While independent counties that print their own VNCs are likely to continue to do so out of their local EMS, the requirements also had to cover the case of counties using the optional VoteCal EMS if implemented.)

S8.2 – This requirement's intent is unclear as VoteCal holds all the approved records.

Independent counties will continue to do their election management processes (such as processing vote-by-mail applications, processing returned vote-by-mail ballots, and election worker management) within their local EMS. It is presumed that these processes will depend on the copy of the voter registration records within the local EMS. This requirement was included to provide an alternate automated mechanism for such independent counties to be assured that the local copy of voter registration, upon which these processes rely, in fact matches the official records in the VoteCal system.

S9.1 – County user is required to have this capability as well.

Requirement S9.1 was written to provide the SOS with the capability to review outstanding unresolved registration and list maintenance exceptions to verify the counties are addressing them in a timely manner. This is a capability specifically identified by the US DOJ as required under HAVA. The corresponding requirements for counties to have notice, track, and resolve such exceptions are spelled out throughout requirement sections S9 through S16. (e.g., requirements S10.9, S11.4, and S13.4). How this will actually be implemented will depend on the winning proposal and the subsequent refinement of requirements during the design phase of the project.

S9.2 – Again, losing county does not verify the loss of a voter and should not be required to take on this extra step.

As clarified above, there is no requirement for the “losing county” to verify the loss of a voter, only the capability to do so if they wish.

S10.6 – County will require paper record of material being matched in order to maintain proper records. Without updating paper material, match cannot be verified.

As noted above, there are already voter registration transactions that occur without a paper record – such as DMV COA transactions, CDPH death records, CDCR felon records, and duplicate registration records that have been identified.

S12.1 – Current data from these sources has been unreliable and unusable as it is not complete. Without detail as to start date and end date of sentence, this data is unusable. How will system verify end date has been achieved before allowing voter to register?

As we’ve stated in conversations we have had with counties, and particularly in the regional county VoteCal briefings, we do not expect the CDCR felon data to ever reach a level of confidence where this data could be applied automatically.

With the current Calvoter interim solution, we maintain an ongoing record of convicted felons who are in prison or on parole. We receive regular updates from CDCR, which include notice when a person is no longer a felon in prison or on parole, so that we can delete the person from that database. This requirement specifies that the VoteCal system must generally continue to provide this function, including removal of a person from the dataset when their sentence has been served or terminated. The exact manner and technology will depend on the proposal from the winning vendor.

S13.3 – Losing County must have access to all paper records before it can verify any change to the voter record.

Please keep in mind that the new VoteCal system will prevent duplicate registration records in most cases by identifying an existing registration record for the voter at the time of entry and, in those cases, will make the transaction an update to the voter record.

Under VoteCal, when a county receives notice of a potential duplicate the county will have access to all the registration data regarding matching voters. This includes voting participation history, images of current and historical affidavits, and voter signatures – regardless of the

county. What additional data would you need on paper to determine whether a matching record is or is not the same voter?

S15.1 – EC 2220 requires this process be *completed* 90 days prior to the election. This includes all data entry and confirmation tasks. Starting at E-90 will leave the county out of compliance with election code.

Understood. This is not a technological issue for the RFP, but a matter of policy and practice down the road.

S15.2 – It is unclear why State will be printing these. Will County have ability to conduct its own residency confirmation notices? SOS will need to have intimate knowledge of each county's election cycles, including special and local elections.

We wrote the requirement for the State to have that capability. It may make sense for the State to do so for purposes of uniformity or economy. This will be a policy decision for all of us to make at some point in the future.

S15.3 – County must also have the ability to format its RCP's.

As we have specified the system, independent counties can continue to generate the RCPs out of their local EMS, which would provide them with this functionality.

S17.4 – There are many other items to consider in this list, including human readable bar code, language preference, and cross-over options. County needs to have the option to print in any format used by county; this should not be limited to 3 predetermined formats defined by SOS. This should also be an electronic option for those counties choosing electronic roster books.

We agree. You will note that the immediately following requirements, S17.5, S17.6, provide for the capability you have requested. Counties will have the capability to export the required roster data to print the rosters themselves in any format they choose, or to import into an electronic roster system.

S18.1 – VoteCal must also record local election codes and status of the ballot (challenge codes).

S18.3 – Must also record status of the ballot (challenge codes).

With regard to defining the code used, we are inclined to disagree that counties need the ability to create and edit the codes used within the VoteCal system for any given election. This raises the possibility of configuring different codes for the exact same election. One of the purposes of HAVA and the statewide database was to establish uniformity in the data. Nothing in this requirement precludes counties using whatever code they wish for an election within their local EMS so long as that code is translated to the proper assigned election code when that data is exported to VoteCal.

Can you provide clarification on what you mean by "challenge codes" and how it fits into the data set of voters who have voted in a particular election and how they voted?

S19.2 and S19.4 – VoteCal must also be able to record which ballot type was mailed and non-deliverable mail information.

With respect to independent counties, we thought this data was only needed for the actual management of vote-by-mail ballots and would be supported by your local election management system. With respect to the VoteCal system, we have only specified the data to determine: the voter's general vote-by-mail status; the voter's election participation history (i.e., which elections the voter voted in and how); and, for presentation on the website, the status of a voter's mail ballot (e.g., mailed, returned, counted/not counted, etc.)

For the VoteCal EMS, please refer to requirements E23.1, E23.8, and E23.14.

Please let us know if you still believe the requirements need to be modified to cover this concern.

S20.1 – VoteCal must also provide data on which ballot / type should have been voted and which contests voter was eligible to vote (count, partial count, no count, etc.).

This information seems more pertinent to your local voting system, your local EMS or the VoteCal EMS, rather than the core VoteCal database. Furthermore, reconciling the difference between the ballot type voted and the ballot type the voter was eligible to vote seems more appropriate to provisional ballots where the voter may have gone to the wrong precinct to vote. For vote-by-mail voting, we expect that the appropriate ballot style is known for the voter when you send them the ballot.

Please let us know if you think there is something we're failing to consider here.

S20.3 – VoteCal must be able to perform a full provisional check on the record, including address, party, signature and ballot type.

We believe this would be a function of your local EMS. Accordingly, we've only written a requirement for the VoteCal EMS to provide this functionality. (see requirement E25.2)

S22.1 – There is extensive file maintenance in the absentee module as well as various automatic actions taken by EMS following each election per election code. None of this is addressed in the RFP. SOS should ensure all absentee module requirements are included in the RFP and end product.

For independent counties, this is functionality we would expect to continue to be supported by the local EMS. As we have written the requirements for the VoteCal system, the VoteCal database would only need to see the results of this processing: whether the voter voted (voter participation history), status of mail ballots (for presentation on the web), and updates to the voter registration record.

For the VoteCal EMS, we have tried to specify the appropriate functionality for file maintenance while processing vote-by-mail applications and vote-by-mail ballots. Please refer to requirement sections E22 and E23.

S23.1 – VoteCal must be able to list all parties on various reports. VoteCal must be able to combine all non-qualified party registrants into non-partisan lists for reporting and voting purposes.

You are correct in terms of the VoteCal functionality, but this requirement speaks to our (SOS's) ability to manage and track contact information and status for the political parties. The ability to combine and report registrants of non-qualified parties together with DTS voters is implied in requirement S24.1 and the reporting requirements in Exhibit VI-5 and VI-6, starting on page VI-118.

S24.3 – VoteCal must report all political subdivisions for each county, not just state level entities.

S24.4 – VoteCal must allow County user to define and modify format and content of ROR.

No. Requirement section S24 speaks specifically to the Report of Registration that the SOS is required to compile and publish under EC §2187. The county functionality for reporting is covered in the reporting requirements in Exhibit VI-5 and VI-6, starting on page VI-118.

S25.2 – VoteCal must separate this request to ensure County-mailed Sample Ballot Pamphlet is mailed to all voters, including those who opt out of the state pamphlet.

This requirement was included because of proposed legislation that voters be given the option to “opt out” of receiving the state pamphlet by mail. While there is currently no law to support this, we wanted to include the capability in the system should such legislation be passed in the future.

The requirements of section S25 speak only to the requirement for the SOS to produce and distribute the state Voter Information Guide under EC §9094. We assumed that the distribution of sample ballots would continue to be managed from the local county EMS. Therefore, we have only required such functionality for the optional VoteCal EMS (requirements section E24).

S25.4 – VoteCal must stay current with all USPS mailing regulations.

For the VoteCal system, as it is to be delivered, we believe this is adequately covered by the language of S25.4 and elsewhere where there are requirements to produce mailed material or mailing lists in a batch basis that conform to USPS standards. We know of no practical way to require vendors to deliver a system that is capable of being compliant with unknown future mailing requirements.

S25.7 – VoteCal must ensure County required information is included in Sample Ballot Pamphlet, such as polling place name and address, polling place accessibility and all required ACS data.

S25.8 – VoteCal must flag system files for mailing of County materials.

This information is important for mailing Sample Ballots – a process we anticipate will continue to be managed by the local EMS for independent counties, not the central VoteCal system. For the optional VoteCal EMS, please refer to the requirements in section E24, Sample Ballot Mailing.

S26.1 – VoteCal must also record requestors ID.

We will take this under consideration for future addendums to the RFP.

S27.3 – Is it the intent of this RFP that Jury Commissioners will obtain JWE's solely from SOS?

No, however, SOS currently and historically has received such requests from the federal courts. Construction of a jury wheel in accordance with their process is not fully automated and is time consuming. We have required the capability to fully automate this process in section S27. You will note in requirement S27.1 that we have specifically required such capability also be provided to counties within VoteCal.

S28.1 – File must automatically update when affidavit is returned to ensure proper tracking for NVRA purposes.

We believe that functionality to store NVRA reporting data is covered in requirement S2.17, and implied by the various reporting requirements in Exhibit VI.5 and VI.6, starting on page VI-118. For independent counties, we expect the ability to capture that data while processing a returned affidavit would be provided by the local EMS, in which those counties are expected to continue to perform registration processing.

This section of the RFP was written to create a mechanism for the SOS and counties to record the issuance of batches of blank VRCs for registration drives, so that if there is a potential problem with incoming affidavits (such as large numbers written with the same pen and handwriting), investigators can quickly identify the source of the problem.

S29.4 – Current County website provides image of polling site, map directions and sample ballot image for each election.

This functionality is outside the current scope of the VoteCal project. We see nothing in the VoteCal requirements that precludes counties from continuing to provide this service on their website.

S29.7 – VoteCal website, to the extent it interacts with County website, must comply with County style and accessibility requirements.

There is nothing in the VoteCal RFP that contemplates or requires such interaction with the county websites.

S29.9 – VoteCal, if it represents and interacts with county voters, must be accessible in all county required languages to be compliant with VRA.

We are currently considering such a modification to the requirements to support all NVRA language requirements.

E3.3 – Losing county will not have access to other county's files.

We specified in the VoteCal system (requirements S1.1 and S1.2) that:

- counties will have full read/write access to the data for voters within their county,
- counties will have read-only access to the full registration data in VoteCal for all other voters in the State.

Requirement S1.2 provides the exception to this rule. If a county receives a registration affidavit for a voter that is currently registered in another county, the new county will have the ability to update the pre-existing registration record with the new affidavit information and, thereby, move or “take possession” of the voter. (As noted above, we have also stipulated the capability for the “losing” county to override that “move”, thereby automatically splitting the registration data into two records for different voters.)

E6.3 – Limiting view of voter registration records to 2 may be inadequate.

There is a practical limit of how much data can be *simultaneously* displayed on one monitor screen. We felt that this requirement was adequate as a minimal standard for the optional VoteCal EMS.

If you still feel this requirement is inadequate, please elaborate further.

E7.1 – EC2220 requires the RCP procedure to be *completed* by 90 days prior to the election. This includes the mailing and data entry of returned postcards.

Understood. This is not a technological issue for the RFP, but a matter of policy and practice down the road.

E10.1 - Listed requirement should include details on how addressing will interact with districting.

We have to disagree. Under our “solutions-based” business procurement, we are responsible for identifying the outcomes (i.e., “what the system must do and deliver”), not the “how”. This is left for the vendor to identify based on the technology of their proposal.

We believe that the functionality to validate residence address during registration entry is covered by requirement E3.12. We believe the capability to translate addresses to political districts is covered by requirement sections E10, E11, E12, E13 and the VoteCal EMS reporting requirements in Exhibit VI.6.

If you disagree, or think we have missed something in these requirements, please provide more detail.

E13.1 – Listed requirement does not include local districts, such as fire, water, park, and school districts.

Correct. That is covered in requirement E13.2. *(If you think that is inadequate, please let us know.)*

E13.10 – It is unclear how this requirement will operate in a dissolution situation.

This requirement was written to prevent “orphaned” voters and precincts, that is precinct and voters who have not been assigned to an appropriate district. It is left to the bidders to propose *how* they will accomplish this within their proposed system.

E15.3 – VoteCal must also include history for elected office.

If you will provide more explanation of what you mean by “history for elected office”, we will be happy to take this under consideration for possible future addendums to the RFP.

E19.1 – VoteCal must also provide separate quantities for each language for those counties that print single language ballots and sample ballots.

We thought this was implied by the term “ballot style”, but will consider a clarification to the language of the requirement for possible future addendums.

E20.1 – VoteCal must also associate certain images for each polling place, such as site image and equipment layout.

Thank you. We will consider this additional requirement for possible future addendums to the RFP.

E21.2 – VoteCal must associate history of precinct officials.

This is covered in “current and historic participation in training”, “current and historic role assignments”, and “current and historic voting precinct assignments”. *Can you please elaborate further on the history data you think we have left out?*

E21.10 – VoteCal compensation data fields / format must be editable by county.

Can you please elaborate further?

E23.2 – VoteCal mailing lists must produce labels in any format requested by county.

Producing mailing labels “in any format requested by the county” with respect to specific functional requirements is an arduous task for a vendor. The general system reporting requirements are spelled out in technical requirement section T13. You will note that in T13.7 through T13.9, we have specified a custom report-writing tool that allows users to build and save their own reports.

E23.12 – VoteCal must interface with other external systems for signature verification.

We considered this outside the scope of a basic EMS system and beyond the needs of the counties that would most likely use the optional VoteCal EMS. This might be more appropriate for a potential future upgrade to the optional VoteCal EMS, if it is bid and is accepted as part of the VoteCal proposal. *Please let us know if you strongly disagree.*

E23.15 – VoteCal must include this information on a ‘voted twice’ report.

The purpose of this requirement is to *prevent* the acceptance of multiple mail ballots for a voter in the same election while processing returned mail ballots. You will note in Exhibit VI.5, Investigations reports section, we have required a report that identifies voters who have voted more than once in an election.

E24.1 – VoteCal must also allow for customizable printing as required by county, such as overprinting vbm request area with notice to pvbm voters, voter ID # (barcode and human readable) and voter county total tracking number.

We will take your request for customizable notice and voter ID# under consideration for possible future addendums to the RFP.

Can you please elaborate on what you mean by “voter county total tracking number” and how this data would be used so that we can further consider this request?

E24.3 – VoteCal must record the type of *sample* ballot sent.

Thank you for catching this error. We will be sure to correct this in the next addendum to the RFP.

E25.1 – VoteCal must allow for ‘partial count’ entries including reason for partial count. Envelope number must be optional.

With respect to “partial count”, do you mean the determination of which contests on the ballot the voter was eligible to vote for the purpose of tabulating a provisional ballot? If so, we understand this to be a function of the voting system rather than the VoteCal EMS. Or are you saying that in your HAVA required “free access” system for provisional voters to “determine if their ballot was counted and, if not, the reason why not”, you currently differentiate between “counted” and “partially counted”?

With respect to “envelope number”, we will take your request under consideration for a possible future addendum to the RFP.

E25.3 – Neither HAVA nor EC14310(d) require the free access to be the internet. Delete or modify this requirement to meet the language in the code sections mentioned.

We recognize that neither HAVA nor EC §14310(d) require the free-access method for determining the status of a provisional ballot be solely available on the Internet. This is our requirement for the system. The citations are presented so that (a) a reader will understand why we have included this requirement in the system and (b) to require the vendor to provide functionality that meets these statutory requirements.

E27.1 – VoteCal must also be able to process specific requirements of school district reorganization petitions as well as Governor recall petitions. SOS staff must determine the operating rules for statewide petitions in regard to filing date and petition received date, which is currently different in each county and would trigger different random sample dates for each county.

“VoteCal must also be able to process specific requirements of school district reorganization petitions as well as Governor recall petitions.” - Agreed. Are you saying this requirement, as written, precludes this? If so, please elaborate.

“SOS staff must determine the operating rules for statewide petitions in regard to filing date and petition received date, which is currently different in each county and would trigger different

random sample dates for each county.” – This sounds more like a policy issue to be determined by the SOS and election officials down the road, rather than a technological requirement for the system. If you disagree, please elaborate.

E28.5 – VoteCal must provide option to view entire VRC scanned image.

We will take your request under consideration for a possible future addendum to the RFP.

E28.7 – VoteCal must allow the county to define additional rejection codes.

We assume you are referring to requirement E28.8. If so, we disagree from a system administration point of view. Since the reason codes could quite possibly be shared amongst different counties using the VoteCal EMS, we did not want the possibility of one county modifying or deleting reason codes that another county used. For the purpose of uniformity and administration functionality, we felt it made more sense to have this type of system configuration controlled by the system administrators. Our expectation is that SOS administrators would work with the county users to identify and standardize the codes that are needed.

E28.11 – VoteCal must allow signature verification to continue once the minimum number of signatures has been reached.

Nothing in this requirement precludes continuation of signature verification beyond the minimum. The members of our county technical advisory committee requested this requirement so that county staff would know the minimum had been reached and could suspend verification if they wished.

E28.12 – VoteCal must display additional fields, as required by the county, including type, petition name and random %.

We believe these data elements are covered by requirement E27.1. The actual method of viewing this data will be left to the vendor to identify in their proposed system. The vendor will work with county users to refine the method of viewing during the system specification and design phase of the project.

T1.10 – It is unclear what authority will be required to perform this function. Under what rules will revocation be administered? What notice will be given to operator or affected county administrator staff? What happens to the records being processed by ‘revoked’ staff at time of revocation?

This capability was included so that administrators could take action to boot an unauthorized user from the system to protect the data from any further potential damage. The rules on how this would be administered and the form of notice to the county are a policy call rather than a requirement of technical capability and, therefore, outside the scope of the RFP. What happens to the record(s) being processed at the time of revocation is left to the vendors to identify in their proposals.

T3.6 – System unavailability for 6 hours during an election will result in voter disenfranchisement, if it occurs during peak election periods (E-15, election night, etc.).

Requirement T3.6 speaks to routine, scheduled downtime for system maintenance. Because we understand system unavailability is not workable during peak election periods, we wrote the next requirement, T3.7, which specifies that the system must be capable of running for eight weeks without interruption for such routine maintenance.

T4.2 – Limiting VoteCal to 2,000 concurrent users will result in county not being able to meet election code deadlines. RFP should be revised to consider number of permanent staff in each county office and add 25% for increase in temporary workers, all of who will be concurrently using system during peak election periods.

We'll take your feedback under consideration for possible future addendums to the RFP.

T4.3 – Limiting VoteCal support to 30 million records will not accommodate all the active, inactive and cancelled records. VoteCal must also provide for a variety of images to be associated with each record, such as purge postcards.

With respect to capacity for the number of voters, we are requiring the system be delivered with the capacity for 30 million active, inactive and cancelled voters. Currently we have approximately 20 million active and inactive voters statewide in Calvoter. Thirty million seems more than adequate capacity for the time span in which VoteCal will be delivered. (Keep in mind that many cancelled voter records in your systems are actually voters who've reregistered in other counties.) We've also required that the system be upgradeable to a capacity of 100 million voters down the road. *If you still feel this is inadequate, please provide more information.*

We are considering capacity specifications for attached document images for a future addendum to the RFP.

T5.2 and T5.3 – VoteCal webpages must maintain standards of county websites. County cannot alter format of Board approved webpage.

We are unclear on why the VoteCal website must maintain the standards of county websites or why County Boards of Supervisors would need to approve the format of the VoteCal website. Nothing in the VoteCal RFP contemplates counties not continuing to run their own websites as well.

T11.1 – What is county involvement in this evaluation and testing?

As the legal administrators of the VoteCal system (as required by HAVA), SOS staff will be responsible for testing and verifying that county EMS systems remain in compliance with the interface and integration standards for VoteCal. The bidders are left to identify how they envision that process as part of their proposal. This will be refined and finalized during the implementation phases of the project.

T15.4 – It is unclear what the intent of this requirement is. Limiting any report to 4 customizable fields will limit the usability of the system.

This requirement was included to provide a measure of flexibility and adaptability to the database and system should we identify new, unanticipated data element requirements in the future. For example, if a statute was passed that required the tracking of whether polling sites

were publicly or privately owned, we would have the capability to define one of these customizable fields as “ownership” and start collecting the data without requiring the vendor to modify the system. This has no bearing on the capability to customize reports, which is covered in requirements T13.7 through T13.9

Exhibit VI.5 – Generally: VoteCal must be able to support all current County reports and report variations.

It is expected that independent counties, would continue to generate most of their reports within their local EMS systems, as VoteCal would not include much of the required data for those counties (e.g., election definitions, candidates, petitions, election workers, polling places, address/precinct resolution, etc). Rather we have tried to focus on the required reports for SOS administration. If there is a specific report you believe we have missed, please let us know.

Exhibit VI.6 – Generally: VoteCal must be able to support all current County reports and report variations.

We have identified the required basic reports for the optional VoteCal EMS system, as well as provided a capability for county users to create and save custom reports. Please let us know if you think any required reports are missing from the list.

VI.6, 10 – Mail Voting Management section; This section’s reporting requirement is limited and does not address the multitude of reports utilized by County. VoteCal should include all reports required by County in this exhibit.

Please identify the specific nature of any reports you believe we need to add so that we may consider them for a future addendum to the RFP.

TECHNICAL COMMENTS FROM THE COUNTY’S CENTRAL IT SECTION ARE LISTED BELOW.

The following are the concerns I have noted relative to this RFP. My comments are based on my understanding of pages III-10 through III-12 which clearly outline the HAVA requirements the State is seeking to comply with via this RFP. The most critical of these requirements from a technical perspective (as well as business process) is the requirement to “centrally” manage the official Voter Registration Database. All other requirements, though relevant, are contingent upon this factor so most of my comments will speak to this fact.

1. Page III-23: It has been represented that the “External Network” is the Internet community when in fact this represents (as we understand it) the dedicated circuits to each County as shown in Figure III.9. We would hope that there is no “co-mingling” of what we deem ExtraNet (County circuits) and InterNet within the Cal-Voter Security Architecture. SoS InterNet services must operate independent of ExtraNet Calvoter services.

2. Page III-24 Our security team holds that direct or proxied-indirect access to key systems (as in the current system) is not a valid long-term security relative to the data types and potential system exposures in question.
9. Page VI-99, T6.4: The statement about Firewalls at the County should be clarified. Is this County operated firewalls or SoS operated firewalls

Thank you for pointing out these concerns. We will take this under consideration for a possible future addendum to the RFP.

3. Page IV-7, Section 3, Paragraph 2: Relative to the security of individual voting records there appears to be a liberal handling of how records will be updated out of jurisdiction. We can only conclude therefore that there exists some ability to view voting records universally throughout the VoteCal System. Appropriate Security language should be included to promote the necessary measures and mitigations that must be implemented to limit views to appropriate jurisdictions (the discussion on item (2) page IV-9 should be augmented to include stronger language).

Keep in mind that Section IV of the RFP is meant to be a high-level narrative overview of the proposed VoteCal system, not a specific statement of the requirements. The ability for counties to view *all* records in the system, together with the restriction that only the county of residence can generally update/modify a voter's record are stipulated in Section VI, requirements S1.1 through S1.4. The business rules for processing voter registration updates are further enumerated in requirements section S4. As noted above, there are multiple protections in the requirement for counties to control whether or not such external changes are automatically applied or require county review and "blessing" before they are applied. Finally, we have developed requirements to provide the county the capability to "undo" any such external transactions they believe were incorrectly made.

4. Page IV-10, item (h) Public Website: Any website used to provide voter status should not directly or indirectly (through proxy of any nature) the VoteCal database. Instead the query should be made to a replicated store of elements necessary to satisfy the request.
7. Page VI-56, SoS Processes: Public Website: Again this writing lends itself to indirect system access the primary VoteCal system which we believe to be ill-advised

Thank you for pointing out this concern. We will take this under consideration for a possible future addendum to the RFP.

5. Page IV-11, item (b), Security: Security should be applied end-to-end (Application to Application) not just over "network links not contracted directly to SOS"

Thank you for pointing out this concern. We will take this under consideration for a possible future addendum to the RFP.

6. PageIV-13, item (k), Network Environment: This requirement is highly subjective. While it is understood that the "Internet referenced" portion of this requirement has been implemented to reduce expenditures to smaller Counties or achieve perceived cost savings for SoS, it is not recommended. There is no guaranteed quality of service, nor vendor performance requirements for Internet routing. Circuit costs have dropped significantly enough to suggest that price is not an issue. Furthermore, though point-to-point VPN tunnels could be deployed to further protect VoteCal traffic the unwarranted risk and public perception make this stance undesirable.
8. Page VI-99, T6.2: This requirement appear to contradict other previous "Internet" statements.

It is our intent that the VoteCal system will continue to operate over a private WAN. If Internet connectivity is allowed, it would only be to provide a secure redundant path. The network requirements are detailed further in Section VI, requirement section T6. We are considering further clarification in a possible future addendum.

In terms of overall network security and structure the RFP appeared to be lacking. In part this was the intent so as to make the vendor develop the overall system model based on business requirements provided by SoS. However, we feel it lacks sufficient definition to guide the vendor to the most suitable network/security architecture .

Also, though it is understood that this is a State RFP, there appears to be insufficient County "voice" as to those elements which directly affect the County. While this is anticipated, based on other state RFPs (ex CalWIN) there is no reason not to adequately represent County interests. Speaking to County network security interests the following is a summary of concerns either weakly represented in the RFP or not represented at all.

1. The VoteCal Extranet (connections to all Counties) should consist of privately leased circuits to each County
2. The VoteCal design must ensure , since it holds connections to all 58 counties and other state agencies, that SoS does not serve as an integration or propagation point between its connected networks
3. The VoteCal system is a endpoint system, not a bridging system
4. Neither the Counties nor the State should intermingle Internet and Extranet traffic. These must be kept separate on either end.
5. Encryption should occur both at the network layer (point to point VPN) and at the application layer (SSL) for all data in transit
6. Again, it is recommended that any web exposed portion of the system only interact with a replicated subset of the VoteCal system not directly or indirectly with the system itself
7. It is anticipated that bidirectional traffic (origination of session) will be required in some form. This communication should be minimized to discrete ports (443 for example). No port requirements which call for excessive ports or ports which do not represent secured communication (ex NetBIOS) or ports held in common with known exploits will be permitted. Port requirements must be succinct and/or

port shifted where capable (to mitigate common propagation – databases for example)

8. The County would appreciate input or updates when the Connectivity Design of VoteCal is being proposed by the awarded vendor.

As noted above, we understand these concerns you have expressed and we will take them under consideration for a possible future addendum to the RFP.

Hopefully, this helps. We had similar comments for DHA's CalWIN project which ended being a state derived initiative with little consideration for the direct impact to the Counties. Luckily they had periodic forums in which the Counties could track solution development and allowed them to course correct the project as required (the point of number 8 above).

We appreciate the time you have taken to review the RFP and for providing feedback to us. Keep in mind that under the "solutions-based" (business-based) approach that we are using for this procurement, our goal has been to specify the "outcomes" and results for the system. The "solution" is for the bidders to determine and to propose the technology they feel is most appropriate. We expect this will result in the most competitive pool of bids possible, so that SOS can select the very best valued proposal in terms of features, technology, and taxpayer cost.

Within the State's framework and rules for managing procurements, we have tried our best to obtain county feedback and advice, by means of meeting with the county technical advisory groups and, after the release of the RFP, through regional county debriefing meetings, asking for comments and feedback.

As noted at the outset, once the implementation contract is awarded to a vendor, our restrictions on communication will largely disappear. We expect that the counties will be highly involved in the initial planning and design stages (and understand this is imperative to the ultimate success of the project.) We are looking forward to working together with all of the counties to implement the best possible system for managing voter registration for California's voters.